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The road taken: the institutionalization of 
economic sanctions as an instrument at service 
of international collective security
O caminho tomado: a institucionalização das 
sanções econômicas como um instrumento a serviço 




This paper addresses the institutionalization of multilateral economic sanctions from a 
historical perspective, aiming at explaining when, why and how economic sanctions became 
an instrument of deterrence and coercion in the toolbox of collective security. First, it is 
shown that a new concern emerged in the Hague Conferences, in which states began to 
institutionalize international arbitration as a pacific mean to solve international disputes: 
how to enforce arbitral sentences in an anarchic international system? Economic sanctions 
were then envisioned as an eventual remedy to pressure recalcitrant states into complying 
with the terms of the sentences. Second, the paper describes the process that resulted in 
economic sanctions becoming autonomous deterrence and coercion tool in the Covenant of 
the League of Nations, showing the liberal-idealist framework that shaped it, the expectations 
surrounding economic sanctions and the cases in which they have been applied. Finally, it 
describes the realist ideas that influenced the creation of the United Nations, whose Charter 
lists economic sanctions as an instrument to be used in the collective security framework 
but at that time less prominently than the use of force.
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Resumo
Este artigo traça a institucionalização das sanções econômicas multilaterais a partir de uma 
perspectiva histórica, com o objetivo de explicar quando, por que e como as sanções econômicas 
se tornaram um instrumento de dissuasão e coerção a serviço da segurança coletiva. Para 
tanto, primeiro demonstra-se que uma nova preocupação emergiu das Conferências de 
Haia, quando os Estados começaram a institucionalizar a arbitragem internacional: como 
executar essas sentenças em um sistema internacional anárquico? É neste momento que 
as sanções econômicas passam a ser vistas como um eventual remédio para pressionar o 
Estado recalcitrante em cumprir com os termos de uma sentença desfavorável. Em seguida 
descreve-se o processo que resultou na institucionalização das sanções econômicas como 
uma ferramenta de dissuasão e coerção autônoma no Pacto da Liga das Nações. Apresenta-
se como o referencial liberal-idealista moldou esse processo, as expectativas que existiam 
por trás das sanções econômicas e os casos em que sanções econômicas foram aplicadas. 
Por fim, o artigo descreve as ideias realistas que influenciaram a criação das Nações Unidas, 
cuja Carta constitutiva previu as sanções econômicas como um instrumento de segurança 
coletiva, mas àquele tempo lhes conferia papel menos proeminente que o uso da força.
Palavras-chave: sanções econômicas, segurança coletiva, Conferências de Haia, Liga das 
Nações, Nações Unidas. 
Introduction
In a world were governments and people buy and sell things, and invest and 
transfer money beyond national borders, it is crucial for states to maintain the 
international commercial and financial channels open. Closing these channels 
harms states’ economic health. That is why economic sanctions are a painful 
instrument in the toolbox of international organizations, used to threat or coerce 
states to change their course of action.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has imposed more than 
twenty mandatory economic sanctions2 in name of collective security. This 
represents a substantial increase comparing to only two mandatory economic 
sanctions imposed from 1945 to 1989. The content of economic sanctions is also 
quickly changing. Present day sanctions are becoming increasingly targeted, in 
contrast to the mostly comprehensive sanctions imposed in the beginning of the 
2 Mandatory economic sanctions are the ones imposed by the Security Council and that all states are constrained 
to obey.
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1990s.3 But when, why, and how economic sanctions became an instrument of 
deterrence and coercion in the toolbox of collective security? To answer these 
questions this article is divided in three parts.
First, it is shown how the Hague Conferences, in which states began to 
institutionalize international arbitration as a pacific mean to solve international 
disputes, created a concern over how to enforce arbitral sentences in an anarchic 
international system. Economic sanctions were foreseen, at least theoretically, 
as an effective remedy to pressure recalcitrant states, defeated in international 
arbitration, to comply with the terms of the sentence.
Second, the article explores the process of inserting economic sanctions in 
the Covenant of the League of Nations as an autonomous tool of deterrence and 
coercion to be used against states that have threaten or broken peace. It is shown 
how the liberal-idealist framework shaped this process, the existing expectative 
behind it, and the cases in which economic sanctions were applied as well as the 
outcomes reached.
Finally, the article describes the realist ideas that influenced the creation 
of the United Nations (UN). In the UN’s institutional framework, use of force 
gained prominence over economic sanctions, which was perceived as a naïve 
and liberal-inspired tool. Time, however, would prove economic sanctions an 
increasingly important tool serving collective security.
The Hague Conferences and the question on arbitration 
decisions’ enforcement
The first Hague Conference was proposed by Tsar Nicholas II. In 1898, he 
invited the major powers to jointly discuss mechanisms of arms control and 
peaceful means of conflict resolution.
The late XIX century and the beginning of XX century were the apex of the 
system of complex alliances between European countries. This system has a 
date and place of birth: the 1815 Congress of Vienna, held after the end of the 
3 Comprehensive sanctions have also been called collective sanctions and their aim is to “hit the nation as a 
whole, including individuals and groups that are not particularly responsible [for the situation that triggered 
the sanction]” (GALTUNG, 1967, p. 381). Targeted sanctions, by their turn, are imposed on individuals or 
non-state entities. The high humanitarian costs of comprehensive economic sanctions imposed on Iraq and Haiti 
(GARFIELD, 1999) and the rise of international individual accountability made UNSC rely mainly on targeted 
sanctions since the mid-1990s (GIUMELLI, 2011, p. 11-12).
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Napoleonic wars: “at the end of the nineteenth century the traditional system 
of empires, built on the basis of power relations, mainly military or economic, 
reached its maturity”4 (DI NOLFO, 2002, p. vii). Therefore, it’s not surprising that 
the Tsar’s invitation to discuss arms control and peaceful settlement of disputes 
caused astonishment and produced little expectation in most European capitals 
(EYFFINGER, 1999, p. 16).
Despite incredulity, all major powers attended the conference in 18995. 
According to Abler, two reasons can explain their attendance: (i) even without 
believing in the potential of achieving effective results, no one wanted to be 
responsible for the failure of the conference; and (ii) most importantly, the 
Tsar’s letter of invitation and the carefully drafted agenda limited some more 
controversial issues. For example, on the agenda for discussion was a proposal 
for international arbitration which was less threatening to the invitees than the 
issue of arms control (ABLER, 2008, p. 15-16).
Between May and July 1899 the twenty-six states represented at the Conference 
issued six voeux, three declarations and three conventions6: (i) Convention for 
the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, (ii) Convention with respect to 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, and (iii) Convention for the Adaptation 
to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention of 22 August 
1864. The First Convention is considered the greatest advance on multilateral 
instruments available to states to deal with peace and security issues made 
by the two Hague conferences. In fact, the Second Hague Conference, held in 
1907, failed to establish a system of compulsory arbitration for the resolution 
4 In the original: “alla fine del secolo XIX il sistema degli imperi tradizionali, costruiti sulla base di rapporti di 
forza prevalentemente militari o economici, raggiunse la sua maturità”.
5 Sovereigns and heads of state represented at the first Hague Conference: “His Majesty the German Emperor, 
King of Prussia; His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc., and Apostolic King of Hungary; 
His Majesty the King of the Belgians; His Majesty the Emperor of China; His Majesty the King of Denmark; His 
Majesty the King of Spain, and in his name Her Majesty the Queen-Regent of the Kingdom; the President of the 
United States of America; the President of the United States of Mexico; the President of the French Republic; 
Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India; His Majesty the 
King of the Hellenes; His Majesty the King of Italy; His Majesty the Emperor of Japan; His Royal Highness the 
Grand Duke of Luxemburg, Duke of Nassau; His Highness the Prince of Montenegro; Her Majesty the Queen of 
the Netherlands; His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Persia; His Majesty the King of Portugal and the Algarves; 
His. Majesty the King of Rumania; His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias; His Majesty the King of Serbia; 
His Majesty the King of Siam; His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway; The Swiss Federal Council; His 
Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans; and his Royal Highness the Prince of Bulgaria. (SCOTT, 1920, p. 161) 
6 Conventions and Declarations are non-binding to the signatory states. Voeux are wishes and, as such, express 
expectations on how discussions can evolve. They indicate general guidelines for further discussions on issues 
in which the delegates failed to reach an agreement. Voeux are not binding. (BAKER, 2011)
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of disputes between states. Thus, despite the limits of the voluntary system of 
conflict resolution, which was anchored in good offices, mediation, conciliation 
and international arbitration, it is remarkable that the states also agreed on creating 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the first permanent international institution 
created to arbitrate international conflicts in a “system of empires” era. The preface 
of “The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences” stated:
The Peace Conferences held at The Hague were the first truly international 
assemblies meeting in time of peace for the purpose of preserving peace, not 
of concluding a war then in progress. They marked an epoch in the history 
of international relations. They showed on a large scale that international 
cooperation was possible, and they created institutions—imperfect it may 
be, as is the work of human hands,— which, when improved in the light of 
experience, will both by themselves and by the force of their example promote 
the administration of justice and the betterment of mankind (SCOTT, 1920).
Following the progressive institutionalization of international arbitration, 
a new question emerged: how to enforce arbitral sentences. The international 
community had not at that time deliberated on tools to pressure a state that had 
voluntarily participated in the international arbitration to comply with the sentence. 
Sanctions were then proposed as tools to pressure recalcitrant states to comply 
with the terms of the sentence. Jacques Dumas, a French jurist, noted in a seminal 
1911 study that the success of the most elaborate instrument to peacefully settle 
international disputes, created in the Hague Conferences – arbitration – depended 
on finding a solution to arbitral sentences enforcement:
It has always been urged, both by skeptics and by believers, that the test 
of the practicability of international arbitration stands on the question of 
sanctions (DUMAS, 1911, p. 934).
Dumas (1911) categorized sanctions as political, legal, criminal, and economic, 
according to their “moral” substance. After presenting data and highlighting 
interconnections on the world economy he sustained that, in such an international 
context, political economy could provide various instruments for the enforcement 
of arbitral sentences. He noted that one of the most effective economic tools would 
be cutting foreign currency transfers that could be used to finance war.
Interestingly, Dumas considered economic sanctions focused on trade dangerous 
to senders, precisely because of economic interdependence. He underlined that 
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these sanctions could effectively damage the target state’s economy, but would 
also harm the sender because (i) the sender state would be deprived of imports, 
what could compromise its economy and (ii) if the sender state wants to sell in 
international trade, it needs to buy, since imports are paid with exports:
Too many people believe, as soon as political economy is concerned, that no 
better sanction could be thought of than boycotting the produce, and, as a 
general rule, all exportations of the unwilling state. Such a sanction may be 
practicable sometimes when the foreign trade of that state is of such a kind 
that the other nations can stop commercial intercourse with it without any 
inconvenience to themselves. But the increasing international character of 
trade and industry will more and more render boycotting impossible. The 
placing of an embargo upon the purchase of needed products amounts to two-
fold self-punishment, first because we would remain deprived of necessary 
articles, even perhaps of raw material, without which our own industry 
could not thrive, and, secondly, because importations are always paid for 
with exportations and our unwillingness to buy results in an impossibility to 
sell (DUMAS, 1911, p. 948).
History would prove Dumas´s predictions wrong. The imposition of economic 
sanctions by international community increased. Their intense use by the United 
Nations Security Council since 1990 seems less conditioned to how interconnected 
the global economy is and more aligned to the structure of political and economic 
interests of the most powerful states. These interests are frequently promoted 
through international institutions and take advantage of their enforcement 
mechanisms in single states.
However, at these earlier stages, a concern on the sanctions effects on the 
population was raised. Dumas stated that making individuals pay for a state’s 
transgressions inevitably works against the development of international law and, 
lastly, against peace. In this rationale lies the key to the evolution of economic 
sanctions in UNSC from comprehensive sanctions to smart sanctions in the 1990s7. 
Effects on the civilian population became a critical issue for the international 
community after the severe effects that followed the economic sanctions imposed 
on Iraq from 1990 to 2003 and on Haiti from 1993 to 1994.
Dumas did not fail to recognize that trade sanctions might be feasible when 
international trade could be stopped without major inconveniences to the senders. 
7 “In a time when the progress of international law consists in limiting all conflicts to governmental concerns, 
and putting the individual out of their sphere, boycotting would be all the more inconsistent with modern 
doctrine, since it is intended to make the individual pay for the faults of the state” (DUMAS, 1911, p. 949).
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So, whether commercial or financial, whether their effects on civilians were 
acceptable or not, the first steps were already given to the acceptance of economic 
sanctions as an enforcement mechanism. They would be instruments to remedy 
the lack of a legitimate international force to enforce arbitral sentences. Economic 
sanctions could, thus, be a safeguard to peace and international security.
The League of Nations:  
economic sanctions to promote collective security
In spite of the good intentions and normative progresses of the Hague 
Conferences, it took a conflict involving the death of more than 4 million Russian, 
French, British and American people to awaken states to the necessity of building 
an international political system guided by principles different from those emerging 
from the balance of power8. Woodrow Wilson sponsored a new way of organizing 
the international system. On 22 January 1917 the President of the United States 
held before the US Senate the world need for an organized peace:
The terms of the immediate peace agreed upon will determine whether it is a 
peace for which such a guarantee can be secured. The question upon which 
the whole future peace and policy of the world depends is this: Is the present 
war a struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of 
power? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, 
who can guarantee, the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a 
tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be, not a balance of 
power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized 
common peace (WILSON, 1917). [emphasis added].
Believing in the power of deterrence that a joint international response would 
have against states that threatened or breached peace, Wilson proposed a totally 
new conformation to international society: the community of power.
What Wilson meant by ‘community of power’ was an entirely new concept 
that later became known as ‘collective security’ (KISSINGER, 1994, p. 51).
8 Balance of power is a core concept to classical realist and neorealist theories of international relations. “The 
concept of a balance of power implies an equilibrium of force as between the States or groups of States, within 
the system in question. Such a balance, it is asserted, works for peace since no State is in a position to seek 
hegemony. The balance may be conceived of as a status maintained by self-correcting natural forces or as the 
product of deliberate human intervention” (VAGTS, 2011).
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In this new conformation, peace would be considered indivisible. It meant that 
a state’s aggression would be considered a breach of the entire peace system and, 
when that happened, all non-aggressor states would unite to halt the belligerent.
Wilson’s activism and the – mainly economic —power that the United 
States accumulated at the end of the First World War advocated in favor of the 
institutionalization of collective security. The new form of international politics 
would be operationalized by an international organization: the League of Nations – 
the first universal political international organization. In the League’s architecture, 
for the first time international security became a collective responsibility, based 
on the acceptance that peace is indivisible and that all states have an interest in 
curbing aggression wherever and whenever it arises. If this threat of collective 
reaction failed, it would be necessary to adopt measures in response.
At that time, European countries, especially France, were apprehensive to 
predict effective mechanisms and measures to prevent violent conflict between 
nations. The demand was that the coming rules “must provide the sanctions 
necessary to insure their execution, and so prevent a false security from serving 
simply to facilitate new aggressions” (BERTRAM, 1932, p. 140).
More than a century after the industrial revolution had consolidated the 
ideas of classic economic liberalism between Western governments, it was not 
strange that measures which were intended to weaken the economic sector were 
perceived as a great tool of deterrence initially, or coercion if necessary. With the 
progressive interconnection of international trade and the possibility of collective 
action, they seemed to be potentially effective.
The British General Jan Christiaan Smuts was largely responsible for the central 
role that economic sanctions assumed in the League of Nations toolbox. He suggested, 
in a pamphlet of great influence released on the eve of the Paris Conference, the 
power of economic sanctions —both commercial and financial —and credited it a 
central role in the effectiveness of a broad League of Nations sanctions’ mechanism9 
(BERTRAM,1932, 141). The measures that the League of Nations could effectively 
9 Anton Bertram describes the context in which General Smuts’ pamphlet comes to public attention and the 
influence it had on President Woodrow Wilson. Considering the terms of the pamphlet Bertram also stretches 
General’s recommendations to the use of economic boycott as a powerful weapon: “I therefore recommend [...] 
(19) That the Peace Treaty shall provide that if any Member of the League break its covenant under paragraph 
(18) it shall ipso facto become at war with all the other Members of the League, which shall subject it to complete 
economic and financial boycott, including the severance of all trade and financial relations, and the prohibition of 
all intercourse between their subjects and the subjects of the Covenant-breaking State, and the prevention as far 
as possible of the subjects of the Covenant-breaking State from having any commercial or financial intercourse 
with the subjects of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not” (BERTRAM, 1932)
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take to restore peace when moral persuasion was not enough were finally put 
forward in article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Woodrow Wilson 
drafted this article incorporating economic sanctions as suggested by Smuts:
Article 16. Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its 
covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have 
committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby 
undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial 
relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the 
nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, 
commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-
breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the 
League or not. (LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 1919) [emphasis added].
Article 16 was considered “League’s heart of collective security system”10 
(BARACUHY, 2005, p. 39). In it, the economic sanctions were legally codified and 
elevated to an autonomous deterrence and coercion mechanism, outside the war 
efforts, admitted to ensure collective security. To put it another way, economic 
sanctions were seen as a mechanism to prevent the use of force. This emerged from 
the recognition that the pressure that economic sanctions could exert conferred 
on them an irresistible power of persuasion:
A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this 
economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force. 
It is a terrible remedy. It does not cost a life outside the nation boycotted, but 
brings a pressure upon the nation which, in my judgment, no modern nation 
could resist (PADOVER apud HUFBAUER et al. 2007, p. 1).
It is the most complete boycott ever conceived in a public document, and I want 
to say with confident prediction that there will be no more fighting after that. 
There is not a nation that can stand that for six months (Bertram 1932, 144).
The rationality of states as well as some idealism, especially Woodrow Wilson’s, 
who believed it was possible to transcend power politics and the endemic character 
of war11, strongly echoed in the rules of collective security that were put in place. 
The logic inherent in the economic sanctions’ mechanism assumed the growing 
economic interdependence in international society and the rationality of states:
10 In the original: “coração do sistema de segurança coletiva da Liga”.
11 The basic idea behind the liberal tradition is the assumption of rationality as a basic characteristic of humanity. 
It is the rationality that enables the transformation of social relations and leads to overcome the power politics 
and the endemic character of the war. (HERZ, HOFFMANN, 2004, p. 51).
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The theory was that the complexities of modern commerce had rendered 
no nation self-supporting and therefore capable of resisting a general 
economic boycott. A nation threatened with such a siege would not think it 
worthwhile to persist in a course of action liable to lead to that result. The 
League was thus based on optimistic assumption about the rationality of 
states and the effectiveness of economic pressures on them (RENWICK apud 
ABLER, 2008, p. 23). 
When the League of Nations started working, questions soon emerged about 
the content and procedural rules that should be applied to economic sanctions. 
Article 16 listed measures that should be taken independently by individual 
states on the involvement of the League’s Council. In 1921 “the Assembly of 
the League adopted guidelines stipulating that the Council could recommend 
to the member states an appropriate plan of action and secure the assistance of 
a technical commission” (KRISCH, 2012). In 1929, the International Blockade 
Committee was created. Its conclusions and recommendations, formally accepted 
by the General Assembly in the first report submitted, served to guide discussions 
about the implementation of economic sanctions by the League of Nations. In the 
“operation’s scheme” to put in place economic sanctions, the Committee’s first 
item was dedicated to clarify that economic sanctions should not be used as an 
act of war, but as a form of peaceful pressure. In addition, the Committee stressed 
that there should be a simultaneous and complete coordination mechanism; that 
economic disruptions should be gradually strengthened, preserving humanitarian 
relations; that the ban on food should be adopted only as an extreme measure; 
and finally, if – and only if – necessary in a situation unsolved by sanctions 
enforcement, the reactions of the League should develop into a state of war.
Since then, the League of Nations’ economic sanctions were treated as a form 
of peaceful pressure to use against a state which decided on war or aggression 
in breaching Articles 12 to 15 of the League´s Covenant12. The Liberal-idealist 
framework, considering the growing interdependence of states and believing in 
the rationality of relations between them, could not consider economic sanctions 
as anything other than an “irresistible pressure to which no nation could resist”.
12 Articles 12 to 15 echoed the adoption, at League Covenant, of conciliation and arbitration procedures designed in 
the Hague Conferences. Moreover, art. 14 provided for the creation, as proposed by the Council, of a Permanent 
Court of International Justice [PCIJ]. The PCIJ worked from 1922 to 1940 and during this period dealt with 29 
contentious cases and emitted 27 advisory opinions. (BIBLIOTECA VIRTUAL DE DIREITOS HUMANOS, 2013).
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As mentioned before, although peace was conceived as indivisible – a 
responsibility all and every state – states were responsible to assert, individually, 
if the obligation to enforce sanctions had effectively arisen. It was believed states 
would behave in good faith so there was not only an individual obligation to 
verify the need for sanctions but also a moral (not lawful) obligation to punish 
the emerging aggressor:
Wilson’s view prevailed as the Covenant ultimately provided for a voluntary 
approach for member states to decide, based on a unanimous recommendation 
of the League Council, whether they want to take military or economic 
measures against a member that had committed aggression (ALEXANDER, 
2009, p. 21).
Hans Kelsen pointed out a structural deficiency in the “‘League’s heart of 
collective security system”. He said there was a failure in Article 16 because despite 
prescribing immediate application of sanctions for those who violated Articles 12 
to 15 (regarding disrespect of the obligation to submit the dispute to international 
jurisdiction), it was not clear who would declare that a state had violated the rules 
and would be therefore subject to sanctions13. All things considered, it would 
behoove each state to say whether or not the violation existed and, consequently, 
only in this case would emerge the obligation to apply sanctions (KELSEN, 1951).
Finally, the decision-making system of the League´s organs, based on 
unanimity, topped the list of normative difficulties at the institutional level for the 
application of sanctions. If considered the decision would be taken collectively, 
with the organization bodies in their entire composition, a member state should 
literally vote against itself in order to enforce the League’s mechanism of sanctions.
The following table shows cases in which the system of economic sanctions under 
the League of Nations has been invoked. It is possible to notice initial successes, in 
the 1920s, when the Council’s threats to use economic sanctions had some effect. 
In the 1930s, with the war winds approaching, the legal limits to adopt a sanction 
recommendation and the rising Germans threats buried the liberal expectations that 
with sanctions in place there would be no more military aggressions. Article 16 was 
effectively applied only in the conflict between Italy and Ethiopia.
13 The Assembly of the League “adopted a number of amendments to the Covenant, which, for example, granted 
the Council the authority ‘to give an opinion whether or not a breach of the Covenant has taken place’. The 
Council was also to recommend to the member States the appropriate moment for the application of economic 
enforcement measures. However, these amendments were never ratified and retained the character of non-
binding guidelines” (KRISCH, 2012).
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Polish general seized Vilnius, 
Lithuania’s capital
Poland abandoned Vilnius before Council’s 




Yugoslavia Invasion of Albania
League threatened Yugoslavia with sanctions and 





Conflict between Greece 
and Bulgaria with friction in 
the border area and Greek 
occupation of territory









Japan invaded China 
(Manchuria). Both states 
were League’s members.
As Japan was member of the League, it held veto 
power over the issue. This situation led to the 
absurd – but legitimate – conclusion that League of 
Nations (LoN) could only act with the accordance 






Chaco War between Bolivia 
and Paraguay. Both states 
were League’s members.
Sanctions recommended in the form of arms 
embargo, but neighbor states refused to stop 
sending weapons. In 1934, the LoN suggested 
to lift the embargo imposed on Bolivia but to 





Italy Italian invasion of Ethiopia.
Sanctions imposed in 1935 (except on oil, coal and 
steel) and lifted in 1936, when Italy consolidated 
its position in Ethiopia. It was considered a big 
failure of LoN economic sanctions mechanism. 
Nevertheless, League’s response to Italian 
aggression must be understood within the political 
context of a rising aggressive Japan and a resurgent 
Germany14. It is considered the only economic 
sanction effectively applied.
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on Abler, 2008, p. 29-30; Hufbauer et al., 2007; Alexander, 2009, p. 23).14
14 Facing the growing impotence of the League of Nations and in a context where collective security was more a 
wish than a reality, Britain and France preferred to hardly damage Italy in order to make it not tend to a coalition 
with Germany – which recovered its power under the leadership of Hitler – if the war broke out. The Council 
of the League recommendation – which avoided the Italian veto by a procedural maneuver to convoke a special 
conference to define what sanctions would be applied against Italy – was to impose on Italy an embargo on the 
supply of weapons and military goods, a prohibition from financial dealings with Italy, cessation of imports 
of Italian commodities and the refusal to sell certain products. These sanctions were considered elastic and 
not universal because they did not included oil, coal and steel trade restrictions. The other measures taken, 
such as denying passage through the Suez Canal, allowed war materials to continue to be shipped from Italy 
to Eritrea. Even without impacting too severely on political leaders and the Italian population, the sanctions 
and the cost of the war caused the Lira to be devalued by 25% in November 1935. The country was forced to 
sell almost 100 million dollars in gold and both imports and exports fell. British and French concerns about 
Ethiopia, which were not great, ceased when Hitler denounced the treaties of Locarno and sent German troops 
to the militarized region of Rhenania. Feeling a threat of a German aggression materializing, to push Italy into 
the arms of a coalition with Germany was an undesirable risk and made the Ethiopian case a concern of lower 
case in Europe. (NYE, 2009, p. 116-117; HUFBAUER et al, 2007, p. 102).
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Thus, despite the success of economic sanctions’ threats on smaller states 
during the 1920s, in the following years they succumbed to the most urgent and 
existential needs of the central states. Facing concrete acts of aggression since 1939, 
states’ immediate survival could not wait the time that the economic sanction 
needed in order to act effectively, nor could states rely on the support to be given 
by a collective security system unrepresentative of international society, on which 
neither the United States nor the Soviet Union were willing to contribute to the 
enforcement of measures adopted. Economic sanctions shown to be not a real 
option in the states’ toolbox for ensuring and articulating the collective security 
required in order to prevent war. Instead, states would be impelled to appeal 
directly to weapons.
The United Nations: economic sanctions initially distrusted – but 
still there
In the same year that the Second World War broke out, Edward Hallett Carr 
published “Twenty years of crisis: 1919-1939”. His scathing criticism of idealistic 
postulates intended to remind the world of the prominence of power in world 
politics. Carr’s goal was 
not merely to remind his readers about the importance of power in world 
politics, but, rather, to show that the crisis of which he wrote in 1939 was in 
large part the result of what he viewed as a serious mismatch between the 
depth of the world’s disorders and the liberal solutions many thought might 
solve these after World War I (apud Cox, 2010, p. 1).
The liberal idea of equality, for instance, and its reception at the League of 
Nations through the formal recognition of a legal equality, which is reflected in an 
equality of power between states in the decision making instances, demonstrated 
an inadequacy for the dynamics of power at the time. The most powerful states 
would not join such an international organization scheme, unless the institution 
recently created reflected the distribution of power in the international system. 
Accepting this perspective, “the League of Nations could only be effective to the 
extent that it was an instrument of national policy of its most powerful members” 
(CARR, 2001, p.182).
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If, on the one hand, the construction of an equal system, even formally, 
between the states to ensure world peace was discredited, on the other, the concern 
with collective security was more alive than ever. Unsurprisingly, already in 1941 
the Atlantic Charter, signed between the leader of the British government, Winston 
Churchill, and the US President, Franklin Roosevelt, enunciated the need to create 
an extensive and permanent general security system. In 1943, in Quebec, the two 
leaders agreed that the initiative to create an international organization for peace 
and security maintenance belonged to the states who led the fight against the 
Axis – the Big Four (US, Soviet Union, Britain and China).
The pillars of the new political international organization were designed at 
the Dumbarton Oaks meetings, in 1944. The terms accorded were also discussed 
at Yalta and at the San Francisco Conferences, where the UN Charter was finally 
adopted. The pillars discussed at Dumbarton Oaks were kept virtually unchanged: 
(i) the Security Council would have the primary responsibility and authority to 
maintain peace and security by non-military and military means; (ii) member 
states agree to adhere to the mandate of the Council and (iii) France and the 
four major leaders which resisted the Axis would be permanent members of the 
Security Council, each one holding veto power (ABLER, 2008, p. 32-37). 
Box 2 – Main institutional differences between the League of Nations  
and the United Nations




Unanimity criteria both in the 
Council and in the Assembly.
General Assembly: required affirmative vote of 
2/3 of those present and voting; Security Council: 
required affirmative vote of 9 of the 15 members 
and the absence of the use of veto power by any 
of the five permanent members.
Nature of 
decisions
All resolutions, from the Council or 
the Assembly, had no mandatory 
character.
General Assembly resolutions: recommendations 
nature only, with no binding character; Security 
Council resolutions: with non-binding or binding 
nature, depending on the will of the Council. 
Military 
coercion
Not previewed. Previewed (Chapter VII).
Source: Author’s own elaboration.
As the composition of the different bodies and the voting powers of states 
echoed in the new institutional structure (Table 2), there was a real incentive to 
the major powers to engage in the nascent organization. The solution equated a 
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series of disjunctions which existed among the discredited idealists’ claims and 
the actual distribution of power between the states, resulting in a possible model 
of international collective security. 
The new institutional framework pulled away doubts on critical points that 
emerged from the use of economic sanctions in the League of Nations. This was 
made possible by four changes. First, by changing the unanimity rule in the voting 
processes, which ended up giving too much power to small states or leading to 
the unusual situation of a member having to agree with its own punishment in the 
League of Nations. Second, by overcoming the voluntarism in deciding whether 
there had been a threat or a breach of the peace, and also which penalties states 
should apply and how. Decisions would ultimately be under the UNSC’s control, 
which would have the power to issue binding decisions for all members. Third, 
by predicting the use of military force to enforce collective security if necessary. 
Finally, by granting veto to great powers, which could paralyze the organization 
if faced with the possibility of seeing it turning against them.
The gap which existed in the League of Nations regarding, on the one hand, 
the concern for collective security, and on the other, the distance between formal 
equality and the real power among the states, was repaired. The key was the 
structure, rules, and working mechanisms of the Security Council: “[t]he Security 
Council can be seen as a nineteenth century concept of balance of power integrated 
in the UN collective security framework” (NYE, 2009, p. 213). In these terms, it 
was in the interests of the most powerful nations to be part of an international 
organization that sought to ensure collective security.
Within this framework it was natural that the UN sanction’s mechanisms 
were impregnated with realism. Inside the toolbox to enable collective security, 
economic sanctions were listed but less prominently than the use of force.
The acceptance of military mobilization provided specifically to an organization 
which would not be inert because of the unwillingness of less expressive countries 
could be explained by the general feeling that the League of Nations lacked 
materials and effective means of coercion. Within the realistic orientation that 
prevailed in the academy and among statesmen, this was necessary to avoid both 
the tragedy of a new world war and the ineffectiveness of the United Nations 
against conflicts of significant proportions:
The planners of the United Nations were at odds on many questions, but they 
were in agreement from the outset that the new organization must have the 
power to maintain the future peace of the world through the use of international 
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force. (…) These views reflected a preoccupation with force which was inevitable 
in the midst of war and, also, a general feeling that the League of Nations had 
failed in its task of keeping the world’s peace because it had been insufficiently 
endowed with physical means of coercion (KIRK, 1946, p. 1081).
This concern, moreover, was not new in the political arena. Carr, criticizing 
the “League of Nations’ affairs” stated that “the elimination of assumption of force 
in politics could only be the result of a completely uncritical attitude to political 
problems” (CARR, 2001, p. 137).
Everything was prepared to the acceptance of the vetoing right of the five 
permanent members of the Security Council15, the prominence of this organ in 
matters related to peace and security16, the mandatory character conferred on its 
decisions17, and the concrete provision of the use of force as a collective security 
mechanism18.
After World War II, the structures and dynamics of the new organization 
should meet the general expectation of speed and efficiency:
Sweeping statement were made concerning the coercive powers which any new 
organization must have, and the public was led to believe that this time there 
was to be created an agency which would be able to deal with international 
breaches of the peace almost as swiftly and effectively as law enforcement 
officers deal with an individual criminal within the state (KIRK, 1946, p. 1081).
15 Article 27 of the Charter provides voting rules and the privilege of veto granted to the five permanent members 
in the Security Council: “Article 27 – 1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote; 2. Decisions of 
the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members; 3. Decisions 
of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the 
concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 
3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting” (UNITED NATIONS, 1945)
16 The prominence of the Security Council was agreed by the Article 12 of the Charter: “Article 12 – 1. While the 
Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present 
Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation 
unless the Security Council so requests; 2. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall 
notify the General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace 
and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council and similarly notify the General Assembly, or 
the Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately the Security Council 
ceases to deal with such matters” (UNITED NATIONS, 1945)
17 Binding nature of Security Council decisions: “Article 25. The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and 
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter” (UNITED NATIONS, 1945)
18 Real possibility for the use of force: “Article 42. Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in 
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as 
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, 
blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations” (UNITED NATIONS, 
1945) The operationalization of the use of force was regulated under Articles 43 to 47 of UN’s Charter.
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 11, n. 2, 2016, p. 53-73
69Cristine Koehler Zanella
In the context of agility and efficiency aimed for the new organization, any 
idealistic aspiration should be contextualized within the power of the states. 
Economic sanctions – once the most celebrated of the League of Nations’ tools – 
although referred to in the UN Charter, were re-signified in terms of importance. They 
survived as an instrument less important than the use of force; one that could not 
claim anymore the former importance received in the League of Nations Covenant.
The “realist” school of international relations emerged after World War II 
largely as a reaction to the overly optimistic expectations associated with the 
League of Nations. It was the “utopian” ideas associated with the League 
that provided grist for the “realists” mill; therefore, it was only natural that 
economic sanctions, as the policy instrument most closely identified with 
the League in the public mind, should also be denounced. Whereas military 
force symbolized hard-headed “realism,” economic sanctions symbolized 
fuzzy minded “idealism” and unwillingness to face up to the hard facts of 
international life (BALDWIN, 1985, p. 155).
Despite being linked to idealism, the damaging power of economic sanctions 
was soon recognized. Differing interests between the US and the UK on the one 
hand, and the USSR on the other, made the situation involving the fascist regime 
of General Francisco Franco in Spain impossible to be resolved at the Security 
Council19. On December 12, 1946, under the live fascist ghost already hovering over 
Spain, and in the context of the Cold War, the General Assembly recommended 
the severance of diplomatic relations with Spain. The Western bloc considered it 
risky to act more emphatically – and this included mandatory economic sanctions 
measures against Franco:
[…] in 1946 neither the British nor the Americans could afford the political 
instability and even the danger of renewed civil war which might result 
from any attempt to oust Franco. Consequently they were not prepared to 
intervene with force or support economic sanctions against him (JOHNSON, 
2006, p.50).
As regards the possible impact of economic sanctions, Western countries 
pondered that disruption of trade ties would compromise the general economic 
recovery of the targeted country, eventually contributing to a Spanish inclination 
19 US and UK did not want an intervention, but were in the awkward position of supporting Francisco Franco 
to avoid the natural path to the revolution, as expected by the USSR with the deteriorating situation in Spain. 
(JOHNSON, 2006)
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toward Soviet influence. Thus, the US held the sale of oil to Spain while the British 
considered the importance of this trade for supplies of food, raw materials, and 
industrial products.
A British cabinet note, from 6 January 1947, recognized that:
The British were reliant on Spanish fruit and vegetables and Spanish potash 
for fertilizer to improve post-war food production. British industry also needed 
Spanish raw materials and Spain used its currency earnings to purchase 
manufactured goods from Britain and other European states so adding to 
general postwar economic recovery (JOHNSON, 2006, p. 59).
The discussions on the adoption of economic sanctions at the United Nations 
were starting. However, the dynamics of the Cold War balance of power and the 
voting rules of Security Council froze the organization for forty-five years. The 
same happened with the imposition of economic sanctions. During the Cold War, 
mandatory economic sanctions were adopted only twice: against Southern Rhodesia 
and against South Africa, because of the abuse of power by white minorities in 
these countries (CORTRIGHT, LOPEZ, 2000). However, the ending of the Cold 
War changed the scenario.
During the 1990s, five times as many economic sanctions were imposed 
compared to the previous four decades. Rebirthed, economic sanctions entered the 
UN policy agenda and, up to these days, are one of the most important instruments 
in the international community´s toolbox of measures to enforce international 
peace and security.
Conclusions
This article described the path to economic sanctions’ institutionalization as 
an instrument to ensure international peace and security.
It started by showing that the Hague Conferences, which progressively 
institutionalized international arbitration as a pacific mean to solve international 
disputes, lead to the concern on how to enforce the arbitral sentences. Jurist Jacques 
Dumas article can be considered the first one to present systematic reflections on 
this topic and presented some concerns – as the danger to economic sanctions 
senders – still shape the states concerns when deciding to adopt this measure.
The end of the First World War lead to the creation of the League of Nations. 
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In its Covenant, the economic sanctions were formally conceived as an important 
tool to achieve world peace and security in the international community toolbox. 
For the first time they had been codified internationally as an autonomous 
coercive measure to promote collective security, not linked to an arbitral sentence. 
Convinced on the economic sanctions’ power to dissuade eventual aggressors, 
Woodrow Wilson advocated emphatically in their favor and they were previewed in 
article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. From 1920 to 1935, economic 
sanctions were adopted and distrusted after the League of Nations failure to avoid 
the Second World War (WWII). At the dawn of WWII aggressions, the emerging 
realist school of international relations denounced the too ‘idealistic’ ideas enclosed 
in this organization. Excessive confidence on the power of economic sanctions 
were also criticized.
At the close of WWII the planners of the United Nations (UN) had a shared 
comprehension that the use of international force must be an important tool of 
the new organization. Without the emphasis that could be observed in the League 
of Nations Covenant, economic sanctions were then listed in article 41 of the UN 
Charter as one of many coercive measures to maintain peace and security. During 
the Cold War, the Security Council approved mandatory economic sanctions 
against Southern Rhodesia and against South Africa. In both cases, the reason 
for imposing sanctions was the condemnation of racial segregation imposed 
by white minorities. At those times, the condemnation of racial discrimination 
was one of the few subjects that received the support – or at least the absence 
of formalized objection – from international actors with veto power within the 
Security Council. In the 1990s, economic sanctions were used intensively and this 
measure of coercion remains until now one of the most important instruments in 
the Security Council´s toolbox to enforce international peace and security.
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